Iwrm and the politics of scale: rescaling water governance in Uzbekistan by Zinzani, Andrea & Bichsel, Christine
water
Article
IWRM and the Politics of Scale: Rescaling Water
Governance in Uzbekistan
Andrea Zinzani 1,2,* and Christine Bichsel 3
1 Global Development Institute, University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9PL, UK
2 Geography Unit, Department of History, Culture and Civilization, University of Bologna, Bologna 40100, Italy
3 Geography Unit, Department of Geosciences, University of Fribourg, Fribourg 1700, Switzerland;
christine.bichsel@unifr.ch
* Correspondence: andrea.zinzani@gmail.com; Tel.: +39-333-907-1380
Received: 20 December 2017; Accepted: 2 March 2018; Published: 7 March 2018
Abstract: Over the last two decades, politics of scale and rescaling processes in relation to water have
been debated by several scholars, especially by geographers and political ecologists, who emphasized
their socio-political nature and their interactions with the environment. By contributing to this
debate, this paper analyses rescaling processes in water governance in relation to the implementation
politics of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) in Uzbekistan. IWRM and related
initiatives were promoted worldwide, especially in the “Global South”. These initiatives proposed
the shift in water governance from administrative to hydrographic, or river basin, units. Empirically,
the analysis focuses on the Middle Zeravshan valley in Uzbekistan, where IWRM was promoted
as a part of post-Soviet water reforms. The analysis demonstrates that rescaling water governance
towards IWRM and hydrographic units is inherently political. The evidence shows that the process
is deeply interlinked with interests and power of Uzbek hydraulic bureaucracies at multiple scales.
Firstly, the IWRM sponsored establishment of hydrographic units coincided with a recentralization
of water management, supported by national hydraulic bureaucracies. Secondly, the design of
the hydrographic unit and related boundaries in the Middle Zeravshan valley was driven by
controversial multi-scalar power dynamics and relations between national and province levels,
which emphasized the complexity and the multi-scalar nature of rescaling processes rooted in
Post-Soviet political transformations.
Keywords: Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM); politics of scale; development policies;
hydrographic units; waterscape; Uzbekistan
1. Introduction
Over the last two decades, Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) has achieved
the status of the global water paradigm. Advocated by the Global Water Partnership and other
international organizations since the end of the 1990s, IWRM has become a widely accepted framework
to globally orient water governance towards institutional integration, social, and environmental
sustainability [1]. Since the 2000s, scholars and practitioners have critically engaged with the ideas,
rationale, logics and outcomes of IWRM in terms of the subjectivities of its experts, governance or
the socio-political nature of its central underlying assumptions [2,3]. Despite these contributions,
IWRM has only been partially explored for its underlying principles, in particular, its politics of
scale and multi-scalar rescaling processes [4,5]. Rescaling processes in relation to water resources
have been analyzed and debated in diverse contexts, mainly by geographers and political ecologists.
However, the institutional, spatial, and boundary reconfiguration that IWRM implementation
processes and politics at diverse scales imply requires further analysis. This paper reflects on one of
the central conceptual pillars of IWRM: the proposition that water should be managed according to
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hydrographic rather than administrative boundaries. By focusing on the shift in water governance
from administrative to hydrographic units, this paper analyses the politics of scale, rescaling processes,
and boundaries changes in relation to the implementation of IWRM at diverse scales in Uzbekistan.
The IWRM approach was designed according to the principles of decentralization and devolution
of water allocation and distribution directly to private organizations or water users associations,
especially in highly centralized states [5,6]. IWRM rests on the overarching rationale of promoting the
integration of social, economic, and environmental concerns. It is inspired by the Dublin principles
that were discussed during the International Conference on Water and the Environment (Dublin, 1992)
(Appendix A). Over the last decades, the framework has been promoted by international and
development organizations in both the “Global North” and the “Global South” and adopted in
many regions of the world. At the same time, it has also given rise to much criticism. Both academics
and water professionals have debated and criticized IWRM for many diverse issues, ranging from the
underlying assumptions of the approach, the content and aims of its pillars, to guidelines and politics
for implementation [2,4,7–9].
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it aims to discuss the social and spatial assumptions that
guide the formulation of IWRM pillars, and in particular the shift from administrative to hydrographic
water governance. Second, it aims to contribute and further debates on politics of scale and rescaling
processes in water governance through the focus on IWRM implementation processes and the adoption
of a multi-scalar qualitative approach in a specific case study. We explore these processes in the context
of the Central Asian region, and specifically in Uzbekistan. Whereas water resources in Central Asia
have always played a key role for socio-political and agricultural development, since the collapse of
the Soviet Union water politics have become even more strategic with regard to bureaucratic changes,
processes of state legitimation and consolidation, and international relations. Furthermore, hydraulic
bureaucracies, and their divergent interests and complex power relations, have played a key role in
both national and transboundary water governance transformations. Therefore, the socio-political and
historical context of water politics in Uzbekistan, inherited by the Soviet Union and today influenced
by international development policies, offers a particularly relevant setting to discuss politics of scale
and rescaling processes in relation to the IWRM implementation. Uzbekistan represents a region
where water management played an important role in the succession of different forms of political
regimes ranging from the pre-Russian, Tsarist, Soviet and post-Soviet forms of political rule [10,11].
In Uzbekistan, the IWRM implementation has been promoted and supported since the end of the 1990s
by international development organizations (the Global Water Partnership -GWP-, the World Bank
-WB-, the Asian Development Bank -ADB-, among others) to shape and orient national water reforms.
With regard to the methodology, a qualitative approach was adopted. Empirical data stem from
on-site in-depth field research in Uzbekistan. The field site for this research is located in the Middle
Zeravshan valley, an area that is administratively included in the Samarkand province. The Middle
Zeravshan valley was selected since it is one of the most important river basin of the country.
Historically, it is characterized by extensive hydraulic infrastructural development and irrigated
agriculture. This region is also relevant in terms of political power since Samarkand, the second biggest
city of Uzbekistan, lies in the centre of the Middle Zeravshan valley. Field research was conducted
during three distinct fieldwork stays in Tashkent and in the Samarkand province between March 2011
and December 2012. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews and informal talks
with key informants, experts, and members of the Zeravshan Irrigation System Basin Agency (BISA),
the Dargom Irrigation System Authority (ISA), the Urgut Water Users Association, the Institute of
History and the Institute of Water Problems of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences. Interviews and talks
were also held with representatives of international organizations such as the German Corporation
for International Cooperation (GIZ) and the Tashkent branch of the International Water Management
Institute (IWMI) (Appendix B). Interviews and meetings with selected actors focused on the IWRM
implementation, the design of recent national water governance initiatives, and linked institutional
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changes, units, and boundaries reconfigurations. Data were analysed by adopting an open-coding
approach and then linked to collected literature.
This paper continues with Section 2, which presents and analyses the reconfiguration in water
governance from administrative to hydrographic units in relation to the IWRM implementation.
In Section 3, we advance the concept of scale in order to analyze this reconfiguration, and discuss
rescaling processes in the context of water governance. The focus of the next two sections is on the case
study of Uzbekistan. Section 4 examines and discusses the IWRM promotion and the implementation
of related initiatives aimed at rescaling water governance Uzbekistan, while Section 5 presents these
processes and related multi-scalar power and political implications at basin level in the Middle
Zeravshan valley. Our analysis of the Uzbek context is followed by a discussion and conclusions on
IWRM and water governance rescaling processes.
2. IWRM: Towards River Basin Governance
Our analysis on water governance units and IWRM begins with the discussion of the changes in
units and boundaries sponsored by the IWRM approach. The principle which states that water should
be regulated and managed according to hydrographic boundaries and river basin units is central to the
IWRM approach. The Global Water Partnership states that IWRM involves the “[ . . . ] transition from
water management within administrative units towards water management according to catchments,
river basins or irrigation systems (hydrographic boundaries)” [1,12]. The IWRM approach purports
that the shift of water governance to the hydrographic unit will enable the integration of environmental
as well as social concerns. The environmental concern supports the vision that resources protection
and use would be best assured if management decisions are taken by considering and respecting its
ecological integrity and environmental characteristics. The social concern, in turn, presumes that the
collective action of those who use the resource rises from a joint interest in managing resources,
their use, and protection. According to international organizations promoting IWRM, both the
environmental and the social concerns in IWRM find their spatial expression in a hydrographic
unit for water governance.
The principle of the hydrographic unit closely relates to the others IWRM principles which
aim at an integrative water resources management—integrating all of the stakeholders from water
users to political decision makers and different water uses—and a multi-perspectives sustainability
(2). By means of this principle, IWRM opposes and tries to overcome the presumed ignorance of
hydrosocial characteristics of a watershed and its people attributed by modernist schemes for water
management. In particular, IWRM seeks to alter a mind-set of controlling nature through science and
engineering by integrating socio-environmental concerns.
Whereas IWRM supports hydrographic units based on water governance as a novel rationale of
water resources control, it tends to ignore that this practice existed for a long time, and has been applied
since the end of the 19th century [5,13,14]. Ertsen [15] states that even though the Dutch, the French
and the English irrigation schools were distinct in their design of infrastructures, since the end of the
1800s they all agreed that water management should be based on hydrographic, or hydraulic, units
rather than administrative ones. Hydraulic units refer to areas and boundaries of irrigation systems.
Molle [3] points out that hydrographic and hydraulic units were the norm for water management in
France, Spain and Great Britain at the end of the 19th century, despite the importance that hydraulic
engineering gained during the high-modernist period. In their analyses of contemporary water
governance, Graefe [16] and Bourblanc and Blanchon [17] demonstrate that the high complexity of the
present practices and the infrastructural connectivity of river basins through water transfers shows
that hydrographic units are not the scale of actual water management in diverse parts of the world.
Nevertheless, the administrative principle has dominated water management throughout most of the
20th century. This approach enabled the state, its branches (provinces and districts), and their hydraulic
bureaucracies to control water and consolidate their power. However, this approach has changed
towards the end of the 20th century when the majority of countries, in particular in the “Global North”
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and in part of the “Global South”, shifted towards hydrographic units in water governance, also
due to the support and the promotion of the IWRM rationale by international organizations [3,8,14].
Few countries, especially those characterized by centralized political regimes, where the state plays
a dominant role, still follow administrative rather than hydrographic principles.
A review of literature on water governance reveals that many scholars welcome the
reconfiguration from administrative to hydrographic units. For instance, Uphoff, Ramamurthy and
Steiner [18] state that it is important to align the boundaries of management structures with those of
the hydrographic units in order to integrate environmental with governmental concerns. However,
other scholars question whether managing water according to the hydrographic unit, as is promoted
by IWRM, would be the best practice throughout the world [5,7]. Some scholars are critical of the
idea that this water governance rationale proves to be the solution for every context irrespective of
different management histories, institutional frameworks, and political systems. Merrey et al. [7],
for example, underline that creating new water institutions based on hydrographic boundaries requires
a challenging and expensive political institutional change, which does not ensure an improvement in
water management practices. Moss [19] argues that the replacement of existing institutional units with
new hydrographic ones could lead to boundary problems (“problem of fit”) with regard to spheres of
political influence as well as new forms of competition among water agencies.
As presented at the beginning of this section, a key issue for the implementation of the
IWRM approach is the conceptual and practical delimitation of hydrographic boundaries for water
management. Therefore, it is important to reflect more in depth on this process, especially on its social
dimension. The approach is based on the idea that hydrographic boundaries are to some extent organic
and natural, thus being characterized by environmental processes that have gradually developed over
time [3]. Indeed, besides environmental processes, human interventions, social dynamics, and power
constellations are recognized by the promoters of IWRM for their relevance in the reconfiguration
of hydrographic units. However, in contradiction, they are conceptually integrated into the idea of
a natural water system. Therefore, IWRM proposes that there is an essentially “natural” domain of
hydrographic units. In the case of interpreting hydraulic development and irrigation infrastructures
as natural, such simplifications seem to be problematic [4,20]. Infrastructures are the product of
a long and often complex socio-political and socio-economic history of human’s engagement with
water [21,22]. Therefore, this unit is hydraulic, and is hence characterized by social and engineering
interventions, and not hydrological. Yet, the proponents of IWRM are often oblivious to this distinction
when re-drawing the boundaries for hydrographic management. The rationale that hydrological unit
corresponds to the hydraulic one in IWRM is not only conceptually problematic, but may also lead to
simplistic policy choices and misinterpretation of implementation outcomes [4].
Scholars in the field of Political Ecology strongly contest the idea that hydrographic units could
be natural [23–25]. Rather, they suggest that nature is a socio-political construction, and water is
a socio-natural entity. For their analyses, they propose the concept of waterscape. The waterscape
is the product of complex interactions between water, power, technology, and formal and informal
practices [26–28] (Appendix C). Furthering this argument, other scholars highlight that the physical
delimitation of the waterscape implies contested politics, ideas, and interests. Warner, Wester,
and Bolding [20] argue that the purported naturalness of hydrographic boundaries and units, as well
as the processes of their delimitation, is in fact strongly politically influenced. Hence, they could not
be simply defined as natural.
In this section, we showed that the idea of hydrographic boundaries in IWRM lacks conceptual
clarity. While water management supposedly follows hydrological systems, in most cases, it is
confronted with a hydraulic history. It is important to argue that the idea of natural boundaries in
IWRM to be established for hydrographic water management is quite questionable and opens up
debates. Shifting water management units and boundaries not only reassigns territories, but also
reshuffles institutional and political processes. We suggest that these changes may best be analyzed
with the concept of scale and related rescaling processes.
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3. Scale, Politics of Scale and Rescaling Processes in Water Governance
The understanding of scale as socially constructed, historically contingent, and politically
contested, in contrast to the previous notion of scale as fixed containers, is rooted in Marxist radical
thought. Scholars applied Marxist and neo-Marxist approaches to advance research on the evolution
of capitalism, on production processes, power reconfigurations, collective actions, and related social
struggles [26,29,30]. Even though we are aware of the huge and heterogeneous debate on the concept
of scale and its diverse contributions, which will be discussed below, for the purpose of this paper
we define scale as the relationship between spatial dynamics and political processes [31]. Therefore,
we adopt the concept of scale to investigate the relationship between water governance processes
and their spatial dynamics of hierarchization, differentiation and delimitation. We conceive the shift
from administrative to hydrographic boundaries in water governance not only as a territorial change,
but also as a transformation of networks of hierarchy and power, associated with changes in actors,
institutions and decision-making processes [32]. Scale provides the conceptual lenses for our analysis of
this shift. In parallel, over the last two decades diverse scholars increasingly adopted in their research
the concept of scale to research the environment and environmental changes [23,33,34]. Smith [35]
brought forward the notion of “politics of scale”, which is defined as complex socio-spatial practices,
state and non-state regulations and politics, power interactions, and social struggles, which characterize
and aim the configurations of scales.
Further research contributed to provide new concepts and analytical perspective to think of spatial
units and related hierarchies politically, by reflecting on socio-political interactions. Neumann [29]
contends that any analysis of the politics of scale has to question the scalar practices of social actors,
their knowledge and visions, inquiring power asymmetries, to analyse and understand relations
between them and within different scales. Brown and Purcell [34] add that scales are essentially fluid.
They argue that no scale has any inherent or eternal qualities that make it properly suited to a specific
socio-political or, as it were, socio-ecologic process. Instead, scalar configurations and related shifts are
strategies that are used by actors to pursue specific political projects, which entail socio-political and
spatial transformations. Such projects, pursued by both the state and other national and international
actors, are defined as rescaling processes [29,30]. In order to analyze these processes, it is crucial to
understand the different strategies which actors adopt with regard to rescaling processes, and their
socio-political and environmental outcomes.
Scholars argue that since the 2000s, several processes of rescaling in resources governance
have occurred in the context of globalization and the promotion of global environmental politics.
In addition, a considerable part of analysis on rescaling processes is carried out in the fields of
water governance and politics [26,28,36–38]. Although traditionally water resources management has
been considered a technical matter for hydrologists and engineers, social scientists have increasingly
begun to analyze the political nature of water and processes of its governance, transformations
and contestation [6,13,23,24]. Over the last decades, debates have focused on the suitable spatial
scale and the boundaries for water management [3,39,40], the consequences of decentralization
and deregulations [25,26], the commodification of water resources [27,41], and socio-political
transformations in relation to international development initiatives [8,42]. Recent research by
Harrys and Alatout [38] and Bourblanc and Blanchon [17] contributed to the debate by exploring
the connections between power geometries and rescaling processes by focusing on the Middle East
and South Africa, respectively. Their findings suggest that rescaling processes in water management
are state strategies of nation-building and power consolidation by elites.
With regard to rescaling processes and international development policies, over the last
two decades, international development organizations and donors (the GWP, the WB, the ADB,
among others), who promoted the IWRM approach, have encouraged and supported a number of
states in Africa, the Middle East, South-east and Central Asia (e.g., South Africa, Nigeria, Israel,
Jordan, Vietnam, Laos, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, among others) to change their water governance
principles by shifting from administrative units to hydrographic boundaries [1,4]. These reforms in
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water management were mostly portrayed to be of technical and administrative, rather than political
nature. Thereby, proponents of IWRM not only blinded out the socio-political history of any hydraulic
system, but also excluded the political nature of relegating competences for water management and
control over water resources to different socio-spatial levels. With this section, we argue that it is
relevant to link IWRM implementation, and specifically the shift from administrative to hydrographic
unit, with debates on politics of scale and water governance rescaling process. Therefore, we adopted
this approach to the analysis of these processes in Uzbekistan and in the Middle Zeravshan waterscape.
4. Post-Soviet Water Reforms towards the IWRM Approach in Uzbekistan: A Contested
Multi-Scalar Process
Uzbekistan lies at the heart of the Central Asian region, which is characterized by an arid
and semi-arid environment. The waterscapes of Uzbekistan are part of the Aral Sea basin and
are characterized by the water flow of Amu-Darja, Syr-Darja and Zeravshan rivers. Since ancient
times, the area of Uzbekistan has been significantly shaped, developed and transformed by
hydraulic development projects. In particular from the 1950s to the 1980s, during the Soviet
“hydraulic mission” [6], this entailed the development and reconfiguration of waterscapes through the
construction of large irrigation systems, reservoirs and dams carried out by the centralized state. Thus,
Uzbekistan is characterized by a patchwork of diverse waterscapes (4.2 million hectares of irrigated
land totally), separated from each other and surrounded by steppes, deserts, and mountains [8,42].
Since Soviet times, Uzbekistan has been the most water consuming country of Central Asia due to
intensive cotton agriculture. High-level water abstractions during the last decades have contributed
to severe socio-environmental consequences such as the Aral Sea shrinking. Only the 13% of the
total amount that was abstracted by Uzbekistan for irrigated agriculture originates from the country’s
mountains and glaciers. The remaining 87% is brought to the country by river flow from upstream
republics (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). The distribution of this water is regulated by the Interstate
Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC), which is an interstate agreement and body on Aral Sea
basin transboundary water resources that was formalized in 1992 [12,43].
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan began to reform its water sector. This happened
in parallel with land tenure changes and the dismantlement of state and collective farms.
These processes were challenged both by socio-environmental issues such as the contested
formalization of peasant farm units and population growth on the one hand, and land degradation and
soil salinization on the other [43–45]. In the context of the global promotion of sustainable development,
water security and related international development projects, development organizations such as
the WB, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Nations (UN),
and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation among others (SDC) have sought to assist
and guide Uzbek water sector reforms along the lines of the IWRM approach since the end of the
1990s [8,43]. This donors-promoted reconfiguration of water policies had two aims. Firstly, it sought
to support transitional reform processes towards sustainable development. Secondly, it boosted
decentralization and liberalization of water resources management towards market economy and
participation of stakeholders [4,5]. This donors-driven process was supported by a development
discourse characterized by diverse buzzwords such as empowerment, good governance and capacity
development among others. It is argued that these concepts were used on the one hand to naturalize
and depoliticize the IWRM approach, while on the other hand, to hide the political and economic
reconfiguration related to its implementation [5,8].
In Uzbekistan, IWRM oriented reforms have mostly focused on river basin and sub-basin levels.
Indeed, at the national level the IWRM framework—in contrast with neighboring countries such as
Kazakhstan—was not institutionalized. Despite recent debates on the design of a new water code based
on IWRM, the national sector is still regulated by the post-independence Law on Water and Water Use
(1993), which was partly amended in 2009, as argued by experts of the IWMI and of the Academy
of Sciences [46]. With regard to the river basin and sub-basin levels, the government, supported
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by international organizations, promoted an institutional change based on a shift of responsibilities
from province water departments (Oblastvodkhoz) to river basin organizations, and from district
water departments and former collective farms (Rayonvodkhoz and Shirkat) to water users associations
(WUAs) [44,47,48]. The IWRM oriented water reforms aimed to establish river basin organizations,
in order to replace former administrative units and to promote a sustainable socio-environmental
approach (Appendix D).
In 2001, a special commission formed by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan
prepared the “Program of Measures on Improvement of Irrigated Lands for 2001–2010”. The program was
based on two levels of intervention [47,49]. The first level focused on provinces. It proposed the transition
from fourteen province water departments (Oblastvodkhoz) to seven river basin organizations. While the
province water departments were a part of the administrative organization of water management, the river
basin organizations should represent hydrographic units. Differently, the second level scheme of the
reforms program focused on the shift of water responsibilities from district water departments and former
collective farms to newly established WUAs, which is the milestone initiative of the Irrigation Management
Transfer (IMT) policy and is supported by the IWRM narrative at the sub-basin level. This institutional
water reconfiguration has been analyzed by several authors, such as Yalzin and Molinga [49], Veldvisch [50],
Wegerich [47] NBT [51], Veldvisch and Mollinga [52], Zinzani [53], among others (Appendix E).
By reflecting on the first level of intervention of the reform process, Yalcin and Mollinga [49] argue
that, although the government of Uzbekistan seemed to be willing to introduce river basin governance
and establish hydrographic units, there were also other relevant interests that were related to politics
of scale, which require a deeper reflection. They claim that basin level water reforms towards IWRM
was an agenda that was driven by the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (MAWR) to the
aim of consolidating its power within the bureaucratic apparatus. These reforms should decrease
the Ministry’s dependency on the influences of provincial authorities and hydraulic bureaucrats who
exerted a powerful role in controlling water resources. The reform process was driven and promoted by
A. Djalalov, the director of MAWR from 1999 to 2004. As stated by Uzbek key informants and experts,
consulted and interviewed during field research in Tashkent, the former Minister worked in very close
collaboration with the international development organizations that were operating in Uzbekistan [54].
Following Yalcin and Mollinga [49], Djalalov was critical of the fact that Uzbekistan and other Central
Asian countries were by the end of the 1990s some of the few countries since the global promotion
of IWRM principles still managing water on administrative principles despite recommendations of
the international water community. Therefore, in order to legitimize the MAWR reforms process and
to support agricultural and water sectors structural transformations, Djalalov stressed that it was
necessary to reconfigure the existing national water governance structure. It emerges that reform
plans led to tensions and disputes between province governments (Hokimyat) and province water
departments on the one hand, and the MAWR on the other hand [49]. As argued by a key informant,
these tensions centered on the redefinition of water governance units and boundaries, on political
influence and on power changes. As a consequence, strategic negotiations and institutional disputes
between the MAWR, province governments and their hydraulic bureaucracies led to a reconfiguration
of state-province politics and interactions over the period 2001–2003. The process was confirmed by
experts consulted and interviewed in IWMI and at the Academy of Sciences.
Province governments and their hydraulic bureaucracies were able to shape the agenda and
readapt the reform process, thereby limiting the institutional and scalar reconfiguration of new
river basin organizations [8,49,51,55]. In 2003, instead of the seven authorities proposed by the
MAWR in 2001, ten Irrigation Systems Basin Authorities (BISAs) were established by decree No. 320
(21 July 2003). Only five of them adopt hydrographic principles, while the other provinces maintain
the administrative boundaries of the former province water departments [43,53,55]. The outcome of
this complex and contested process might be understood as an attempt of the MAWR to reduce the
power of province hydraulic bureaucracies and maintain and strengthen the centralized state control
of water resources. However, key informants that were interviewed in Tashkent and in the Samarkand
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province stated that in some provinces heads of province governments, members of province water
departments and hydraulic bureaucracies were able to successfully negotiate with the MAWR and
adapt the reform process to preserve their power and interests [56]. In spite of this resistance to
reforms, the MAWR, with the political and financial support of development agencies, significantly
shaped the rescaling process by supporting a recentralization process for the governance of water
resources. Such a recentralization contradicts the idea of decentralization that was promoted by the
IWRM. In parallel, this discussion showed that the originally planned water reforms in Uzbekistan
met resistance at the level of the province administration. Therefore, their implementation differed
from the original project.
In sum, this section has shown that water governance reforms in Uzbekistan in relation to
the implementation of IWRM principles were politically contested at diverse scales. The proposed
reconfiguration from administrative to hydrographic units for water governance offered a platform
for political contestation between central and provincial governments. We argue that these changes
in water governance units and boundaries were contested as they involve a significant rescaling of
political control and a reconfiguration of power relations within Uzbekistan. Therefore, water remains
a key resource and its control is essential to political elites.
5. Rescaling Water Governance in the Middle Zeravshan Waterscape
This section explores the rescaling process related to the IWRM inspired shift from administrative
to hydrographic water governance in the Middle Zeravshan waterscape. It is relevant to point out
that the Zeravshan River, which originates in Tajikistan between Northern Hissar mountains and the
Western Pamir and it spans over 741 km, is a transboundary watercourse and its waterscape is shared
by Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. While formerly reaching the Bukhara province and the Amu-Darja,
the river flow ends in the eastern part of the Navoi province, due to massive water abstraction in its
middle section [57].
This transboundary waterscape has not been managed as a unique hydrographic unit since the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Neither was this the case during the Soviet regime. Indeed, interstate
water relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have been quite problematic since the 1990s due
to conflicting water demands. The distinction between the upstream and the other sections of the
waterscape is also due to its socio-physical characteristics: the upstream part lacks extensive hydraulic
infrastructural development, and the agriculture is mainly conducted along river banks and on
terraces. These challenges distinguish the Middle Zeravshan valley as a highly relevant case for
analysis. The Middle Zeravshan waterscape extends from the 1st May Dam, located in Uzbekistan
less than one kilometer downstream of the border with Tajikistan; in this area, the river flows out
from the narrow upstream section. Its irrigation system, connected to the 1st May dam, is one of the
largest in Uzbekistan, stretching approximately 50–60 km North to South and 200 km East to West.
It is surrounded in its eastern and northern part by the Zeravshan and Turkestan ranges, while in its
western and southern parts by steppes [58]. The majority of the irrigation system is administratively
included in the Samarkand province (central Uzbekistan), and the administrative boundaries were
inherited from the Soviet Union.
The Middle Zeravshan waterscape, similar to other Uzbek waterscapes, has been developed
since ancient times. A succession of political regimes transformed steppes and deserts through
hydraulic interventions into agricultural lands [11,12]. Several irrigation canals, pumping stations,
small reservoirs, and dams were constructed to divert water from the Zeravshan River for irrigation,
in particular, since the 1950s. This period can be understood as the Soviet “hydraulic mission”,
which was inspired by the idea and rationale of the socialist conquest and transformation of
nature [11,53,59]. During this period, intensive monoculture cotton cropping has been developed
in the Middle Zeravshan waterscape. Today, the extensive canal network expands on both sides of
the Zeravshan River. Its southern part is larger and made up by the most important canals serving
irrigated agriculture, as for instance, the Dargom, Eski-Anghor, and Yangiarik (Figure 1).
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Following the national decree of 2001 on water governance transformations, which led to the
contested, controversial, and heterogeneous rescaling process, Samarkand Province Water Department
was reorganized into the Zeravshan Irrigation Basin Authority (BISA) in 2003. However, the territory of
the Zeravshan BISA does not match the initial criteria that was defined by the “Program of measures on
improvement of irrigated lands for 2001–2010”, which the MAWR supported, as stated by interviewed
members of the Academy of Sciences [60]. Indeed, the original water reforms project foresaw to develop
river b sin governance and the establishment of one BISA for th entir central and downstream part of
the Zeravshan waterscape in Uzbeki n (including Samarkand, Buk ra and part of Navoi provinces).
Instead, besides Zeravshan BISA, the Amu-Bukhara BISA was also established. During the months
that followed the issue of the ”Program of measures” (2001), the river basin governance plan for the
Zeravshan BISA was object of conflicting negotiations between Samarkand and Bukhara provinces
hydraulic bureaucracies, and it was significantly altered in terms of its territory and related boundaries.
Since its official establishment in 2003, the Zeravshan BISA, as explained by their interviewed members,
includes the entire territory of the Samarkand province (which represents the 72% of the total BISA’s
territory), four istricts of Navoi (11%, including Hatirci, Navoi-Konimekh, and Navbackor districts),
three of Jizzakh (7%, includi g Bakhmal, Gallaorol, and Jizzakh dist icts), and on of Ka kadarja (9%,
represented by Chirokchi district) [54]. The total area of the BISA reaches 590,000 hectares [12,53,55].
A closer look at the newly established water management unit reveals that the Zeravshan BISA
follows the hydrographic boundaries of the Middle Zeravshan waterscape. Hence, it emerges
that the newly established authority belongs to the group of the five BISAs (considering the
whole state), which reconfigured their territory in accordance with the decree of 2003. However,
as discussed in Section 4, the IWRM inspired water governance reconfiguration from administrative
to hydrographic units does not represent a “coming back to nature”. Indeed, the new Zeravshan
BISA, based on the hydrographic unit, refers to a hydraulic system which results from a complex
history of relations between water, power and technology, as explained by a key informant in
Samarkand [56]. For example, Kadirov [61] and Abdullaev and Rakhmatullaev [62] point out that
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the canals Tuyatartar and Eski-Anghor, which connect to the Zeravshan River but flow towards
neighboring waterscapes (and provinces), have been continuously developed and reconstructed
since the 14th century. Thereby, they highlight the challenge and complexity of determining basins
boundaries of the Zeravshan waterscape.
It seems that the original idea of the MAWR to promote the establishment of a single BISA
for the whole Uzbek part of the Zeravshan waterscape was significantly altered by the influence
and the power of the Samarkand province hydraulic bureaucracy that oriented this process towards
its objectives. Key informants in Samarkand and interviewed members of the Zeravshan BISA
argued that the actual design of the authority was discussed and was finally decided in 2003 by the
former director and the staff of the Samarkand Province Water Department (Oblastvodkhoz) [54,58].
In a similar line, Abdullaev and Rakhmatullaev [62] provide relevant insights to develop a deeper
understanding of the rescaling process and boundaries reconfigurations, and to historicize power
relations in the Zeravshan waterscape. It seems that contemporary conflicting relations and power
asymmetries between province institutions and hydraulic bureaucracies are rooted and date back
to past decades. During the first half of the 1900s, the Zeravshan Irrigation Basin Management
Authority (Zerdolvodkhoz) administered the Zeravshan valley irrigation system. Already during this
time tensions, disputes and controversies with regard to water control, use, and allocation emerged
between the water administration personnel of Samarkand and Bukhara provinces. These disputes
have continued and developed over the following decades until the 1970s. In 1972, a centralized
Soviet hydraulic development intervention, the Amu-Bukhara pumping system, should mitigate
disputes and power asymmetries between the two provinces bureaucracies and their ambitions.
The construction of the Amu-Bukhara pumping system provided water supply to Bukhara province
through the connection of its irrigation system to the Amu-Darja River [55]. However, disputes
between the two hydraulic bureaucracies seemingly resurfaced in 2001, when the MAWR, in the
pathway to IWRM inspired water governance reconfiguration, sought to establish a new authority
which would merge the two administrations. Finally, as explained above, this process did not happen
as in 2003, when Zeravshan and Amu-Bukhara BISAs were established as separate authorities based
on hydrographic units.
By reflecting on this controversial rescaling process, Wegerich [55] provides an important
contribution and argues that the territory of the Zeravshan BISA and its boundaries were internally
discussed and drawn up under the leadership of the head of the Samarkand Province Water
Department. The process wholly excluded the involvement and the participation of members of
Navoi, Jizzakh and Kashkadarja province water departments. As stated by interviewed members
of the Zeravshan BISA, the above mentioned districts of these administrative units, supplied by
Eski-Anghor and Tuyatartar canals, were added by Samarkand hydraulic bureaucrats to the territory
of the former Samarkand water department in order to match the river basin principles and establish
a river basin authority based on the hydrographic principle [54]. Wegerich [55] suggests that the
Samarkand Province Water Department submitted the BISA draft of the new territory and boundaries
to the MAWR in Tashkent. As it was confirmed by an interviewed key informant in Samarkand,
despite the Zeravshan BISA did not meet the criteria of the original national plan designed by MAWR
for IWRM oriented water reforms in 2001, it was accepted by national hydraulic bureaucrats without
resistance [56]. The influential power of members of the Samarkand Province Water Department
in shaping the reforms agenda towards its interests in terms of boundaries reconfiguration of the
Zeravshan BISA, also comes into view by considering the design of its sub-departments, the Irrigation
System Authorities (ISAs). Despite the fact that the Decree of the MAWR issued in 2003 did not provide
specific guidelines to design ISAs boundaries, in the majority of BISAs boundaries of sub-departments
coincide with those of former district water departments (Rayonvodkhoz). On the contrary, by referring
to the Zeravshan BISA, members of Urgut WUA stated that ISAs were designed and configured
ex-novo by the BISA’s head and the governing board in 2003. Eight ISAs were established: Dargom,
Eski, Tuyatartar-Kli, Mirzapai, Miankal-Toss, Narpai, Karmona-Kanimex, and Ak-Karadarja [63].
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With regard to their territories, interviewed members of BISA stated that ISAs were designed through
the adoption of hydrographic principles following the main, secondary canals, and their irrigated areas.
However, a closer look to the sub-departments’spatial scale shows that the hydrographic principle
was interpreted and readapted in different ways. Some ISAs are based on this principle, while others
incorporate and merge diverse small irrigated areas. Wegerich [55] suggests that this heterogeneous
approach in the creation of ISAs enabled the head and the governing board of Zeravshan BISA to
balance power and interests of small bureaucracies within the districts of the Samarkand province
and the neighbouring ones. Furthermore, their interests were also preserved with the reconfiguration
of district water departments into WUAs, occurred in 2003. Indeed, in the Samarkand province,
WUAs were established keeping the district boundaries with the exception of the Pastdargom district,
where a project that was supported by the WB and the SDC was formalized in 2009. As claimed by
members of IWMI and by interviewed members of the Zeravshan BISA, the creation of WUAs based
on district spatial scale is a unique case if compared to other BISAs in Uzbekistan [53].
Therefore, despite this spatial reconfiguration of sub-departments, driven by province
bureaucracies and in contrast with national criteria, the Zeravshan BISA draft was accepted by the
MAWR. Several explanations are possible to explain this complex and controversial process. First,
personal relations could have played a relevant role. In 2003, as also highlighted by Wegerich [55],
the brother of the head of the Samarkand Province Water Department was the state advisor to
agricultural issues of the president. This personal relationship could have prepared the ground for the
MAWR’s acceptance of the draft that was prepared by the Samarkand Water Province Department,
as hypothesized by an interviewed key informant in Samarkand. Second, this privileged position seems
to be rooted in the Soviet institutional socio-political and economic power relations. Jones Luong [64]
argues that the governors of the Uzbek provinces where the largest quantities of cotton are produced
have held a prominent and powerful role in negotiating water policies and reforms implementation
with national authorities since Soviet times. Due to its agricultural characteristics, this was the case
in the Samarkand province. Therefore, this province could be in a privileged position to negotiate
power dynamics, strategies, and practices regarding water governance rescaling process in the Middle
Zeravshan waterscape.
In this section, we showed that the IWRM inspired water governance rescaling process and related
shift from administrative to hydrographic units in the Middle Zeravshan waterscape entailed marginal
technical and administrative changes, while it was significantly driven by political interests and
asymmetric power constellations. Moreover, the evidence from both field-research and the literature
analyzed enables us to demonstrate that these rescaling processes are embedded in the waterscape
through a complex history of water governance and contentious relations that dates back at least to
the Soviet period.
6. Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper, we discussed politics of scale and water governance rescaling processes oriented
towards IWRM in Uzbekistan. Our analysis on water governance spatial units began with and
centered on the shift from administrative to hydrographic units, the spatial scales supported by IWRM.
We argue, in conflict with the IWRM depoliticized rationale, that redrawing unit and boundaries for
water governance is not a merely technical and administrative process, but results in complex and
conflicting multi-scalar rescaling processes. Following Swyngedouw [26], Budds and Hinojosa [28]
and other scholars, we applied the notion of waterscape to the Middle Zeravshan valley in order to
highlight the complex socio-political and power transformations which have shaped this territory,
as well as recent rescaling processes.
To the aim of analyzing these processes, we explored the implementation politics of IWRM in
Uzbekistan by focusing on the national level rescaling process towards hydrographic units. With the
support of bilateral and international development organizations, Uzbekistan has introduced water
reforms towards IWRM since the 2000s. However, at the national level IWRM has so far not been
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formalized through the issue of a new water code, despite discussions of a new regulatory framework
by national authorities have been carried out for many years. With regard to the basin level water
governance reconfigurations that are inspired by IWRM, we suggest that the initiative of redrawing all
administrative water governance units in the country was of strong interest of the MAWR. This agency
sought to consolidate its position and powerful role as a political actor of the central government
by decreasing its dependency on province governments, their hydraulic bureaucracies, and their
potential conflicting visions. It is hypothesized that the reconfiguration of administrative water
units would have been a strategy of the MAWR to weaken provincial government actors since the
new BISAs, based on hydrographic units, no longer matched the areas, thus, the provinces of their
political influence. However, the attempt to recentralize water governance was met with resistance
by actors at province levels. Moreover, the strategy enabled the understanding of uneven power
relations between provincial governments, but also between provinces and the central government.
These power relations have their own history in Soviet and post-Soviet water governance authorities,
institutions, and irrigation schemes. Therefore, it emerges that only five of the originally planned
water basin organizations inspired by the hydrographic principle were implemented. As the case
study of the Middle Zeravshan waterscape demonstrated, local power dynamics, a historically strong
position of the Samarkand province to negotiate its interests, and, possibly, personal relations to the
top government officials at national level, enabled a water governance rescaling process towards the
hydrographic unit. At the same time, these dynamics also enabled hydraulic bureaucracies to retain
power control based on administrative boundaries, since members of the Samarkand Province Water
Department drove the rescaling process.
By contributing to debates on politics of scale and rescaling processes, the evidence from the
Middle Zeravshan waterscape enables the understanding of how these controversial and conflicting
processes are rooted in the heterogeneous multi-scalar power relations that have developed through
water governance since the Soviet period. Power relations in Uzbekistan emerge as heterogeneous
and multi-scalar since they are deeply interlinked between the national, province and district levels.
Moreover, the evidence demonstrates how the shift from administrative to hydrographic units had on
the one hand served national authorities to consolidate their role and to recentralize water governance,
which is in contradiction with the rationale of IWRM and international organizations. On the other
hand it helped province hydraulic bureaucracies to renegotiate their power and try to preserve
their interests. We therefore argue that the water governance rescaling process oriented towards
IWRM principles has to be understood in the framework of the still ongoing post-Soviet bureaucratic
reconfiguration processes and conflicting and asymmetric power relations which emerge from state
decentralization. The evidence from Uzbekistan and the Middle Zeravshan waterscape furthers the
work of Neumann [29], who emphasizes the need to analyze scalar practices of actors and inquire
uneven power relations, since it highlights the relevancy of multi-scalar interlinked relations in
rescaling processes. In parallel, the evidence strengthens also the argument of Brown and Purcell [33],
who state that rescaling processes are strategies used by powerful actors to pursue specific political
projects that entail socio-political and spatial transformations. Indeed, the case of Uzbekistan and
the Middle Zeravshan waterscape enable the understanding that IWRM was used by both national
authorities and province hydraulic bureaucracies to pursue specific political projects through rescaling
processes. While contributions from critical geographers and political ecologists highlighted the
political nature of rescaling processes, in contrast, these processes and their political implications,
have not been considered by practitioners who analyzed IWRM and its implementation [1,13].
In the beginning of this paper we initiated our reflection on the IWRM rationale and hydrographic
units in water governance by arguing that the neglect of political dynamics and power relations results
in the misleading understanding of hydrographic spatial scales as natural units of a water system.
We also highlighted that the IWRM rationale depoliticized and hid the strategic role of politics and
power in water governance. By adopting the analytical framework of the politics of scale and the notion
of waterscape, our analysis contributed to the understanding that waterscapes and hydrographic units
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are socially constructed and politically contested, and they have their own histories shaped by complex
and conflicting social and power relations. Moreover, by exploring the case of Uzbekistan and the
Middle Zeravshan waterscape together with IWRM, our analysis contributed to the understanding of
the multi-scalar dimension, and the related conflicting relations, in rescaling processes and of their
adoption as strategies to pursue specific political objectives. Therefore, both the implementation and
the analysis of water reforms towards IWRM, which has to be considered as a process at the interface
of water, power, and technology, must take this perspective into account and give due attention to
rescaling processes in water governance.
Acknowledgments: Field-research was funded by the University of Fribourg and the University of Verona.
The University of Fribourg also funded the costs to publish in open access.
Author Contributions: Andrea Zinzani designed Sections 3–5, while Christine Bichsel wrote Section 2. Sections 1 and 6
were designed by both authors.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
Appendix A.
Dublin principles have been designed during the ICWE to guide the conceptual development of
IWRM (ICWE, 1992; 1):
 1—Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, development and
the environment.
 2—Water development and management should be based on a participatory approach, involving
users, planners and policy-makers at all levels.
 3—Women play a central part in the provision, management and safeguarding of water.
 4—Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an
economic good.
Appendix B.
Actors interviewed were selected depending on their role and functions in their institutions.
However, due to the relevant and contested political nature of the topic, only some of the actors were
available for interviews and discussions. With regard to BISA and Dargom ISA, a former member,
a hydro-technician and a policy-maker were interviewed, while concerning the Urgut Water Users
Association, the head, the accountant and a water master. With regard to institutes of the Academy
of Sciences, the GIZ and the IWMI, key informants and experts were interviewed. In total, 15 actors
were interviewed.
Appendix C.
The concept of waterscape has increasingly emerged over the last decade in research that
discusses the interactions between water, power, technology and socio-political dynamics [24,28,29].
Waterscapes are not merely territories within water flows; they comprise the assemblage of a wide range
of water infrastructure, institutions and authorities, everyday formal and informal practices, political
discourses, and narratives which produce, and are produced by, power dynamics. Hereinafter we will
use this concept to refer to Middle Zeravshan valley and its water system.
Appendix D.
Despite the IWRM promoted shift to hydrographic principles in water governance, examples of
river basin organizations have been established already during the Soviet Union. In the Uzbek SSR,
the Zeravshan Basin Authority (which was based on the Middle and the Low Zeravshan waterscape)
existed from the 1930s until the 1970s, when the Amu-Bukhara irrigation system was constructed [63].
However, it seemed to be a special case. In other basins water was managed on administrative
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principles by Oblastvodkhoz. At the Soviet inter-republican level, Basin Water Organizations for
Amu-Darja and Syr-Darja were created in 1984, and then reformalized in 1992 under the ICWC
international framework.
Appendix E.
This paper focuses only on the first level of intervention of the “Program of Measures on
Improvement of Irrigated Lands for 2001–2010”. Therefore, for the analysis of the second level
we suggest to read literature cited in the text.
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